Palestinian Autonomy, Self-Government, and Peace by Harvey Sicherman

Author:Harvey Sicherman [Sicherman, Harvey]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Middle Eastern, Social Science, Political Science, World, Regional Studies, General
ISBN: 9781000310825
Google: pq2bDwAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 49918621
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2019-06-04T00:00:00+00:00

The Jordanian Option Revisited

The next test for consent is Jordan, containing a population more than half of whom are considered to be Palestinians. While the Palestinian nationalists have long conceived of Jordan as a necessary backdrop, ally and potential confederate, they have never been able to reach an enduring satisfactory relationship with its Hashemite rulers. From 1948 to 1967, when King Abdullah and later King Hussein held the upper hand in the West Bank, the Palestinians were kept firmly in second political place, although individuals were allowed high positions in the Court and Royal Administration. Beginning in 1968, the reborn PLO run by Arafat almost took over Jordan and a savage civil war ensued, culminating in Jordan’s violent expulsion of the PLO in September 1970. The PLO’s later disaster in Lebanon and subsequent deadly quarrel with Syria gave King Hussein an opening to reassert his leadership, but neither in 1982–83 nor later in 1985 could the King and Arafat agree on a lasting political modus vivendi for negotiations. Finally in 1988, Jordan officially “withdrew” from the Palestinian scene as the intifadah strengthened the PLO’s hand.

Now both parties find themselves forced to work together on a joint delegation to peace talks and joint negotiations on self-government (autonomy), a turn of events neither sought nor expected. The outcome will depend heavily on Jordan’s own view of the virtues of Palestinian self-government.

King Hussein, unlike Yasser Arafat, has staged an astonishing recovery from the Gulf War during which his “tilt” toward Iraq appeared to cost him vital international support. By avoiding the twin disasters of either civil war (by adopting an anti-Iraq posture) or becoming a combatant (by attacking Israel) the King achieved a political feat unique even by Middle East standards: he became simultaneously popular with both the Palestinians and with Israel’s Likud government. Now, as the designated “senior” partner of the Palestinians, his crucial role reaffirmed by Israel, Hussein is well on the way to shedding the discredited mufti of Saddam’s ally for the more familiar cloak of Arab moderate.

These astonishing events, however, do not speak directly to Jordan’s real interest and probable behavior when it comes to Palestinian self-government. The simple answer is that Jordan must have a role. The King cannot ignore the attachments of his Palestinian subjects, yet he cannot allow those attachments alone to determine his policy. Hussein’s own concept of his dynasty’s historic destiny is balanced against his justly famed instinct for survival.

It may be fashionable to pit the Palestinian nationalists as the antithesis of a bedouin-influenced monarchy, but Hussein actually regards himself as the supreme nationalist.12 His family’s role in the Arab Revolt is a legacy that qualifies Hussein—in his own eyes—to be in the vanguard of those who cherish Arab political independence and dignity. As a descendant of the Prophet, and inheritor of the tide Sherif, the King will never take second place to the Islamists, although he does not press upon his subjects the dogmas of religion.

This being said, Hussein has throughout his career manifested a healthy respect for popular opinion, especially Palestinian.

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